Untethered Norms After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: Positivism, International Law, and the Return of the  Brooding Omnipresence by Brilmayer, Lea
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 54 | Issue 3 Article 3
Untethered Norms After Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins: Positivism, International Law, and the
Return of the "Brooding Omnipresence"
Lea Brilmayer
roberta.brilmayer@yale.edu
Copyright c 2013 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Lea Brilmayer, Untethered Norms After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins: Positivism, International Law, and
the Return of the "Brooding Omnipresence", 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 725 (2013),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol54/iss3/3
UNTETHERED NORMS AFTER ERIE RAILROAD CO. v.
TOMPKINS: POSITIVISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE
RETURN OF THE “BROODING OMNIPRESENCE”
LEA BRILMAYER*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
I. ERIE’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE POSITIVE SIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
A. General Common Law: Some Background . . . . . . . . . . . . 727
1. General Common Law: Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729
2. General Common Law: Provenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
3. Untethered Norms, Popular Participation, and 
Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 732
II. ERIE’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE CRITICAL SIDE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
A. Unavoidable Reliance on Untethered Norms . . . . . . . . . . 735
B. Customary International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 737
1. Customary International Law: What It Is . . . . . . . . . . . 737
2. Customary International Law and Erie’s 
Nonexistence Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 740
3. Possible Distinctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 743
III. CHOICE OF LAW AND UNTETHERED NORMS: 
AN EXPERIMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 746
A. Why Choice of Law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 747
B. Choice of Law: Basic Problem, Urgent Needs . . . . . . . . . . 748
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751
* Howard M. Holtzmann Professor of International Law, Yale Law School.
725
726 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:725
INTRODUCTION
Positivism, in the American legal system, is the jurisprudence of
choice. Law is not some metaphysical creation arising by spontane-
ous generation out of logical or philosophical first principles, which
human judges then decipher.1 Positivism tethers a legal norm
securely to the entity that created it, with that same official entity
calling the shots when the time comes to apply, interpret, alter, or
overrule it. Untethered norms are dismissed as mere “brooding
omnipresences.”2
The case most associated with the Supreme Court’s endorsement
of positivism is Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.3 In an opinion by
Justice Brandeis that dabbled in American history,4 policy,5 and
jurisprudence6—in addition to the usual constitutional law7 and
statutory construction8—the positivists on the Court held that
federal judges should cease their independent determination of
“general common law” and follow in the footsteps of their state court
colleagues sitting a block away.9
1. See infra Part I.
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. See id. at 72 (“But it was the more recent research of a competent scholar, who
examined the original document, which established that the construction given to it by the
Court was erroneous.” (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923))).
5. See, e.g., id. at 74 (“Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed
its defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the rule did not accrue.
Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented
uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of demarcation between the
province of general law and that of local law developed a new well of uncertainties.” (footnote
omitted)).
6. See, e.g., id. at 79.
7. See, e.g., id. at 75, 80 (discussing equal protection and the absence of affirmative
authority for federal courts to address subject matter left to the states).
8. See, e.g., id. at 66, 71 (referring to the Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006))).
9. Id. at 78. For the reference to “a State court a block away,” see Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal
court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different
result.”).
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But the case for the positivist perspective is not as clear-cut as it
first appears.10 The rejection of “untethered norms” is selective, with
positivists relying on them whenever they are needed to prove the
positivists’ point.11 Moreover, it is unclear why general common law
has been singled out for pariah status when other areas of law,
similarly untethered, have not been written off as well. One of these
other areas of law is customary international law, which, although 
nearly as vulnerable to the positivist critique as general common
law, is rarely challenged.12 Perhaps other subject areas, such as con-
flict of laws—a subject with historical roots deep in general common
law—should enjoy comparable indulgence.13 As this Article will
show, there are good arguments in favor of this proposal.14
Erie’s jurisprudence leaves many questions unanswered. And the
fact that Erie got the answer to the basic legal issue right—on
constitutional and statutory grounds—is not a reason to ignore
these questions. Erie began the problem, and that is where we have
to begin the search for a solution.
I. ERIE’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE POSITIVE SIDE
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins is not a case that needs much
introduction; however, it has many different strands and a word or
two is needed to identify which ones are relevant. Our story focuses
on Erie’s jurisprudential features, not its statutory or constitutional
ones, and in particular on Erie’s claim that general common law
does not exist.15
A. General Common Law: Some Background
Erie, as we all know, was based in large part on a reinterpretation
of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, commonly known as the
Rules of Decision Act.16 That Act stated that “[t]he laws of the
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652
728 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:725
several states, except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of
the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply.”17 The central question
in Erie was whether the scope of the phrase “the laws of the several
states” included only statutes, or if it also encompassed state
decisional law.18
The pre-Erie taxonomy of “laws” was formidable. Kermit
Roosevelt lists the different types recognized by general common
law aficionado Joseph Beale, and summarizes their arcane defini-
tions:
Beale’s treatise recognizes several different kinds of law.
“Theoretical law,” for instance, he defines as “the body of prin-
ciples worked out by the light of reason and by general usage,
without special reference to the actual law in any particular
state.” By contrast, “[p]ositive law” is “the law as actually
administered in a particular country.” Last, in some ways
intermediate between the positive and the theoretical law is
what Beale refers to as the “general common law,” an unwritten
body of law “which is accepted by all so-called common-law
jurisdictions but is the particular and peculiar law of none.” The
doctrines of the common law, Beale writes, “are authoritative in
each state whose law is based upon it; and the decisions of courts
of all such states are important evidences of the law.”19 
Some of the types of “laws” that Beale’s treatise mentions qualified
under the Rules of Decision Act as state law that had to be re-
spected in federal courts; general common law, however, did not.
Two characteristics of general common law were implicated in the
fact that it did not qualify as “laws of the several states.” These
characteristics that marked general common law for special juris-
prudential scrutiny were, first, the position of general common law
(2006)).
17. Id.
18. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 71.
19. Kermit Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means
of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1838 (2005) (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted).
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in relation to state decisional law, and, second, general common
law’s provenance of communal authorship.
Norms possessing both of these characteristics will be referred to
below as “untethered.” Positivism rejects the concept of untethered
law. Under positivism, law is not found by searching above and
beyond the state: it is made by decision makers of the state itself
exercising their appropriate political authority. And once made, it
is the law of a particular state—the state that authored it—and not
part of some shared enterprise. It is the position and the provenance
of a norm or set of norms that make it untethered, and general
common law was defective in both of these respects.
1. General Common Law: Position 
The first distinctive characteristic of general common law was its
supposed position in relation to state decisional law. As used here,
“position” includes several interrelated elements. General common
law was envisioned as above state decisional law in authority
because it was considered more substantively reliable and accurate
—the norm against which state decisional law could be tested for
correctness. It was situated beyond the law of any particular state,
meaning that it was outside the reach of state decision making and
control. And it was objective in the sense that judges found it, not
made it.20 These overlapping elements of general common law’s
position will be referred to here as status, locus, and objectivity.
Commentators often used hierarchical and spatial metaphors to
describe general common law’s special position. They referred to
general common law as a “brooding omnipresence in the sky,”21 or “a
transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but oblig-
atory within it.”22 Similarly, “independence” was used to describe it:
20. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
21. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified .... It always is the law of some
State.”).
22. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co.
v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))
(“The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made clear by Mr. Justice
Holmes. The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is ‘a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,’
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general common law was “independent of any particular state or
lawmaking authority ... [but] authoritative in [ ] every common law
jurisdiction.”23
General common law’s supposed position brought it into direct
conflict with basic positivist principles. Positivism denies that there
are binding norms lurking somewhere in the great beyond, waiting
to be discovered. Justice Holmes put the point clearly and simply:
“The fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that
there is this outside thing to be found,”24 adding that “the Supreme
Court of a State does something more than make a scientific inquiry
into a fact outside of and independent of it. It says with an authority
that no one denies ... that thus the law is and shall be.”25 Courts
make law, positivists say. They are not engaged in finding it, and
certainly not in the locations where general common law expected
it to be—namely, outside the reach of state authority.
Of course, there are bodies of law that are apart from and
superior to state decisional law. The U.S. Constitution would be
both “above” and “beyond” the reach of state decisional law if the
two ever came in conflict.26 But general common law is hardly in the
same position as the U.S. Constitution. General common law’s
provenance, unlike the U.S. Constitution’s, is questionable. The
second distinctive characteristic of general common law was its
shared authorship, a fatal flaw as far as positivism was concerned.
that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what the rules of common law
are; and that in the federal courts ‘the parties are entitled to an independent judgment on
matters of general law.’” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (quoting Black & White Taxicab,
276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
23. Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 1838.
24. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Justice Holmes continued:
Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law
or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or
anywhere else.
Id. at 533-34. 
25. Id. at 535 (“Whether it be said to make or to declare the law, [the Supreme Court of
a State] deals with the law of the State with equal authority however its function may be
described.”).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution ... shall be the supreme law of the
land.”).
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2. General Common Law: Provenance
General common law’s second jurisprudentially significant
characteristic was its provenance. General common law purported
to be based on the common law of the states—all of them. It was not
the product of any one state’s decisional law but a synthesis that
took into account the common law of all.27 As one pre-Erie case
applying it explained,
For the discovery of common law principles applicable in any
case, investigation is not limited to the decisions of the courts of
the State in which the controversy arises. State and federal
courts go to the same sources for evidence of the existing
applicable rule. The effort of both is to ascertain that rule.28
 
General common law “was common to, and authoritative in, every
common law jurisdiction whose courts struggled to discern it, but it
had no single source, and hence no single authoritative inter-
preter.”29
As with its supposedly superior position, general common law’s
unorthodox provenance was a direct affront to positivist principles.
Positivism denies that legal norms can exist without a specific state
author. As Justice Holmes wrote in dissent in a prominent pre-Erie
case, “In my opinion the authority and only authority is the State,
and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own should
utter the last word.”30 Thus, there is Missouri law, and French law,
but not “the common law of contracts.” Erie endorsed the positivist
position that law must always be “the law of [a] State existing by
the authority of that State.”31 
It did not improve matters that the individual components from
which general common law was synthesized were themselves posi-
tive law of individual states. The process of synthesizing individual
states’ contributions into a single body of legal norms was not itself
sufficiently objective and reliable.32 It required subjective assess-
27. Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 1838.
28. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 529-30.
29. Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 1838.
30. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 535 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
31. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). 
32. See Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 1857-58.
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ments of which positions were more persuasive or weighty and
required judgment calls about which norms had a greater degree of
state support. Obviously, there are differences of opinion over the
correct results; these are the sorts of things that Restatement
drafters or hornbook writers often debate. And even more obviously,
before Erie was decided, federal judges and state judges used to
disagree about these things.33 If they had not, there would not have
been much need for Erie. 
Synthesizing the various different norms is a creative function.
Even if general common law was based on nothing but an aggrega-
tion of legitimate state court decisions, the creative process by which
these decisions are put together injects an element of decision
making that can only be thought of as political choice. The most
objectionable feature of general common law, from this point of
view, is that an entity other than an official state decision maker
arrives at subjective judgments about contentious legal questions
and then presents the results as objectively binding. This problem
exists precisely because there is no single identifiable official
author; that is why it is necessary to blend the numerous authori-
ties into a single body of legal norms.
Positivism rules out norms without the proper provenance, just
as it rules out norms claiming an unacceptable position. In imposing
these requirements, positivism taps into American political assump-
tions, in particular the commitment to popular participation in
political decision making. By adopting the positivist outlook, the
Court brought the work of our courts more into line with American
conceptions of legitimacy. 
3. Untethered Norms, Popular Participation, and Legitimacy
Before Erie, a premium was placed on whether a decision was
substantively correct. Any judge who believed that he or she was
equipped to determine the correct general common law result was
encouraged to think a legal problem through independently,
consulting precedents from all states and any other logical, moral,
33. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 518; S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205
(1917); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1,
19 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
2013] UNTETHERED NORMS 733
or philosophical first principles.34 Process values, such as procedural
regularity, were subordinated to an elusive notion of substantive
correctness.35
Positivism rejects the notion of substantive values untethered to
particular state decision makers. Other values cannot claim supe-
riority over the decisions of the state because there simply are no
values extrinsic and superior to the state’s decisions. Under
positivism, the denial of untethered legal norms and the limitation
to official state decision makers—themselves chosen democratically
or appointed according to democratic constitutional principles—help
to ensure popular participation. If procedures are followed in
choosing who represents the state, and if those procedures are
themselves legitimate, then the decisions that are made by those
state representatives are entitled to be treated as legitimate too.
As positivism would have it, people are legally bound by the laws
that they create. They are not legally bound by transcendental
principles that exist independently of human preference and over
which they lack any control. Erie’s jurisprudence thus resonates
with essential themes of American democracy. As a secular, liberal
state with a commitment to political pluralism and freedom of
thought, the United States does not employ religious or comparable
morality tests, or other standards imposed from “above” and
“beyond.” General common law had to go because it collided with the
values of popular participation and procedural regularity, all in the
name of an illusion of objective correctness that was hopelessly
wrongheaded.
Today, the conventional wisdom on general common law is that
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins drove a stake through its heart.36
Erie stated bluntly that “[t]here is no federal general common
law,”37 and elaborated:
34. See generally Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the
Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1135-37 (2010).
35. Id.
36. Much has been written about the various sources of support adduced by the Erie
majority. Erie blends constitutional themes with construction of the Rules of Decision
Act—and, in later cases, the Rules Enabling Act—but also grounds the whole operation on its
jurisprudential analysis. Without denigrating the importance of the constitutional or
statutory sources, we will keep our focus narrow, as though the only source of inspiration was
the Court’s jurisprudence. 
37. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
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Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or
“general,” be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts.
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts.38
Justice Holmes made essentially the same point in Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.:
“The fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that
there is this outside thing to be found.”39 His dissent in the familiar
“taxicab case” is now the majority view: general common law is a
delusion. “It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one
august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of any
Court concerned.... But there is no such body of law.”40 Kermit
Roosevelt concludes about general common law that “we have it on
good authority that there is no such thing.”41 General common law,
apparently, does not exist after Erie, and, assuming that Holmes
and Brandeis were correct, it probably never did.
II. ERIE’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE CRITICAL SIDE
To this point, we have focused on the case against general
common law. But there is also a case to be made for general common
law and against its jurisprudential challengers. A threshold issue
concerns what kinds of evidence and arguments should be consulted
to determine whether general common law exists. A second question
concerns areas of contemporary domestic law that appear to be
untethered in the same way as general common law, but are still
recognized as existing law.
38. Id.
39. 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes went on to state:
Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it.
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law
or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or
anywhere else.
Id. In fact, Justice Brandeis also quoted this language in Erie. 304 U.S. at 79.
40. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 1840.
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A. Unavoidable Reliance on Untethered Norms
The first question is what sort of evidence, arguments, and
authorities would be relevant for establishing whether general
common law does or does not exist? Consider, for example, Kermit
Roosevelt’s rejection of general common law due to “good authority”
that it does not exist: 
The regime under which a forum will apply its own under-
standing of general law rather than the understanding of the
geographically appropriate state court is familiar to students of
legal history. It is the regime of Swift v. Tyson, which the
positivists, Oliver Wendell Holmes notably among them,
attacked, and which the Supreme Court rejected in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. And that is the second and more
devastating objection to the appeal to general law: we have it on
good authority that there is no such thing.42
It is not totally clear, but the “good authority” that Roosevelt cites
for the proposition that Erie is correct seems to be Erie itself. 
This raises a host of questions. Is the authority “good” simply
because that is what the Supreme Court decided? If so, then was
Swift v. Tyson “good authority” prior to the announcement of Erie?
Or is the authority for the nonexistence of general common law
“good authority” because it is correct, and, if so, how is that eval-
uation made? Putting the same point a bit differently, is the
existence of general common law a subjective matter, something on
which decisional law is truly dispositive: general common law does
not exist, by definition, because the Supreme Court says it does not?
Or do we consider the Court’s opinion dispositive about general
common law’s objective existence only insofar as its expertise makes
it fairly likely that the Court is right? Or is there some other expla-
nation? More generally, in deciding a foundational question such as
whether general common law exists, should we rely on positive law,
on untethered extralegal norms, or perhaps on both? 
The first Part of this Article, explaining the nature of general
common law and its eventual rejection, relied on untethered logical
and jurisprudential principles that were not part of the positive law
42. Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 1840 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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of any particular state. The Erie opinion did the same. Erie was
motivated by a conviction that Swift v. Tyson was wrong and
Holmes’s dissenting opinions were right. But if Swift was mistaken,
this was presumably as a matter of jurisprudence and not as a
matter of positive law. The reasoning that the majority opinion
rested on to show that general common law does not exist was not
conventional case law but general principles about the nature of
law, state authority, and so forth.43 
There seems to be a double standard in operation; the arguments
used to establish the nonexistence of untethered law seem to be
exactly the sort of untethered principles that are not supposed to
exist. When the Brandeis majority held that there was no general
common law, this was presumably meant as a jurisprudential
principle from someplace above and beyond. Apparently, Holmes
and Brandeis did not intend their denial of the existence of an
abstract legal principle to apply to the debate over Erie’s jurispru-
dential foundations. That debate takes place on a higher plane,
“outside” the sphere of state positive law and on the level of tran-
scendental principle. The evidentiary qualifications for arguments
about Erie’s persuasiveness are methodologically different and less
demanding than the evidentiary qualifications for arguments about
whether a landowner owes a duty of care to trespassers who are
injured by a passing train. The former type of arguments includes
considerations of general logic, jurisprudence, and so forth; the
latter includes only state positive law. 
Of course, it could not really be otherwise. It is not possible to
resolve issues such as the one raised in Erie by looking at only state
positive law. The values relied on are “transcendental” because the
issue itself is “transcendental.” Bodies of law rest on basic principles
of logic and jurisprudence that are assumed to be general and
foundational in a way that the legal norms that rest on them are
not. The foundation, as it were, is built of different stone than the
superstructure. Erie does not claim otherwise.
43. These included premises such as “law in the sense in which courts speak of it today
does not exist without some definite authority behind it” and “[t]he common law so far as it
is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but
the law of that State existing by the authority of that State.” Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting
Black & White Taxicab, 278 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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Such reliance does not really undermine the central Erie holding.
Erie concerned state common law subjects such as torts or contracts,
which were within state power and were not, the Court noted,
constitutionally suited for the exercise of federal authority.44 The
fact that Erie’s jurisprudence must be established in a different way
from Pennsylvania state tort law is hardly fatal to Erie’s interpreta-
tion of the Rules of Decision Act.
Reliance on such values, however, does challenge an important
element of Erie’s jurisprudence: the claim that such things do not
exist.45 And if the door is open to their existence, we need to know
how far their influence extends. We consider one possible example
next. 
B. Customary International Law
The most direct approach to evaluating the claim that “[t]here is
no ... general common law”46 is simply to search for other bodies of
untethered law to see if they are treated as really being law. One
such body of untethered law is customary international law and
another, arguably, is conflict of laws. 
1. Customary International Law: What It Is
Customary international law, in certain respects, might be
thought of as the general common law of the international commu-
nity.47 It consists of international law norms that states adhere to
out of a belief that these norms are legally binding.48 As with treaty
law, customary international law is said to be based on state
consent; although, unlike treaty law, consent to customary law must
generally be inferred from state practice.49 The International Court
44. Id. at 78 (“[N]o Clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts.”).
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 29 (3d ed. 2005).
Treaty law, from this point of view, is the statutory law of the international community.
48. SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1984).
49. See S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“[R]ules
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law .... Restrictions
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of Justice lists “international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law,” as one of the legitimate sources of law.50
Although controversial in some respects, customary international
law’s status as “law” is rarely challenged.51
The types of evidence that may support a finding of customary
international law are almost unlimited. According to Ian Brownlie,
the list includes the following:
diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases, the
opinions of official legal advisers, official manuals on legal
questions, e.g. manuals of military law, executive decisions and
practices, orders to naval forces etc., comments by governments
on drafts produced by the International Law Commission, state
legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals
in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of
treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs,
and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations
General Assembly.52
Brownlie also lists criteria for weighing evidence of customary
international law. He names duration of the practice, uniformity
and consistency of the practice, generality of the practice, and opinio
juris—a sense that the practice is legally obligatory, as opposed to
simply maintained out of habit or convenience.53
In the classic case of The Paquete Habana, decided more than a
century ago, the Court upheld the application of customary interna-
tional law;54 it has never retracted that endorsement55:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”).
50. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
51. See id. (listing “international custom” as a type of international law that is considered
binding).
52. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (7th ed. 2008)
(footnotes omitted).
53. Id. at 7-10.
54. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 677 (1900).
55. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731-38 (2004) (applying standards of
customary international law).
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tion, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat.56 
Here we find explicit recognition that, in the absence of a treaty, law
can be formed from “the customs and usages of civilized nations” as
compiled by international legal scholars. Other cases, especially the
older ones, reinforce The Paquete Habana.57 And in a much more
recent case argued in front of a Court generally considered un-
friendly to international legal norms,58 the Court raised the evi-
dentiary standard for proving individual norms of customary
international law but pointedly did not take advantage of the
opportunity to report its demise.59 
Like general common law, customary international law is clearly
“untethered.” Both seem more “found” than “made,” and the location
where they are found is outside of and above the usual domestic law
of the state. Both are created communally through the gradual
accretion of legal authority from practices and convictions of the
56. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
57. See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) (stating that the Court
would be “bound by the law of nations” until Congress passed a contrary enactment).
58. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address to the
American Society of International Law Proceedings: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal
Courts, in 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 304, 307 (2004) (“[M]odern foreign legal materials can
never be relevant to an interpretation of ... the U.S. Constitution.”).
59. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731-38 (applying the evidentiary standard for proving individual
norms of customary international law). Another limit is refusal to recognize customary
international law because it is not sufficiently precise. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain found that
norms must be sufficiently specific and generally accepted before courts may recognize them
as customary international law: “[C]ourts should require any claim based on the present-day
law of nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.” Id. at 725; see id. at 731-32 (“The position we take today has been assumed by
some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala.... [W]e are persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was
enacted.”).
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entire community of states. Both have been targeted by positivist
skeptics, and the reasons in both cases are connected to the fact that
they are untethered. But they are treated very differently: custom-
ary international law is recognized as enforceable law whereas
general common law is dismissed as nonexistent.60
2. Customary International Law and Erie’s Nonexistence Claim
Generally, international law has struggled for recognition. As Lori
Damrosch and her coauthors put it:
International law has had to justify its legitimacy and its
reality.... Skeptics have argued that there can be no interna-
tional law since there is no international legislature to make it,
no international executive to enforce it, and no effective interna-
tional judiciary to interpret and to develop it, or to resolve
disputes about it.61
It is ironic that positivism, today, is probably the dominant philo-
sophical perspective on international law; it has been dubbed “the
lingua franca of most international lawyers.”62 It is also ironic that
positivism is generally recognized as having played an important
role in the early theorizing of international law63 because positivists
have figured prominently among the skeptics—particularly John
Austin.
Austin’s most formidable challenge to the existence of interna-
tional law was based on his “command theory”:
60. Compare supra Part I (describing general common law), with supra notes 47-59 and
accompanying text (describing customary international law).
61. LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (4th ed. 2001).
62. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International
Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 293 (1999) (“Positivism summarizes a
range of theories that focus upon describing the law as it is, backed up by effective sanctions,
with reference to formal criteria, independently of moral or ethical considerations. For
positivists, international law is no more or less than the rules to which states have agreed
through treaties, custom, and perhaps other forms of consent. In the absence of such evidence
of the will of states, positivists will assume that states remain at liberty to undertake
whatever actions they please.... It remains the lingua franca of most international lawyers.”
(footnotes omitted)).
63. The distinction between natural and positive law dates to Grotius’s recognition of the
distinction between jus naturale and the jus gentium. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 61, at
xxxi-xxxiii.
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Laws properly so called are a species of commands. But, being
a command, every law properly so called flows from a determi-
nate source....
And hence it inevitably follows, that the law obtaining
between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set
by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjec-
tion to its author. As I have already intimated, the law obtaining
between nations is law (improperly so called) set by general
opinion.64
 
Austin denies legal status to international law because law
necessarily “flows from a determinate source” and because “every
positive law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a
state of subjection to its author.”65 Law must be the product of state
decision making and must be attributable to a particular state.
Austin’s reason for denying the existence of international law is,
effectively, that it is untethered. 
General common law and international law are somehow alien to,
removed from, or outside of the usual law of the state. Likewise,
neither general common law nor customary international law is
attributable to a single authoritative source; authorship is com-
munal. Customary international law is formed with input from all
of the state members of international society. Like general common
law, customary international law is a synthesis of the precedents of
many jurisdictions. One old maritime case, The Scotia, described
customary international law in exactly these terms:
[N]o single nation can change the law of the sea. That law is of
universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations can
create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it
rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of
force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but
because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct.
Whatever may have been its origin, whether in the usages of
navigation or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it
64. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 138, 201 (1832) (“The
duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions: by fear on the part of nations, or by
fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils,
in case they shall violate maxims generally received and respected.”).
65. Id. at 138, 208.
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has become the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction of
those nations who may be said to constitute the commercial
world. Many of the usages which prevail, and which have the
force of law, doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of
some single state, which were at first of limited effect, but which
when generally accepted became of universal obligation.66
In both general common law and customary international law, the
final product was a synthesis of state practice and legal assump-
tions from all members of the interstate or international commu-
nity. For general common law, the synthetic function was at one
time facilitated by institutions such as the American Law Institute’s
Restatements of common law subjects. For customary international
law, specialized institutions such as the International Law Commis-
sion assist in collecting and reconciling state practice, international
judicial decisions, and other evidence of customary international law
from around the world. 
Despite these similarities, customary international law and
general common law are different in one important way: there
seems to be widespread agreement that customary international law
exists and general common law does not. The Supreme Court—the
same institution that was responsible for declaring general common
law a dead letter—recognizes customary international law as valid
law.67 This is not to say that customary international law is popular
with the current Court or that its foundations are trouble free. “The
relative legal status of state law, federal statutory law, treaties, and
constitutional law has been an active subject of debate over the
course of American history.”68 But the basic difference in status
between customary international law and general common law is
undeniable.
If the Court does not appear poised to declare that customary
international law does not exist—the way it did to general common
law in Erie—then the question becomes whether there is some
66. The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187 (1872).
67. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731-38 (2004) (recognizing customary
international law as valid by applying it as a standard).
68. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1318 (2008).
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distinction between the two to explain the difference in treatment.
The immediately obvious candidates, however, do not hold water.
3. Possible Distinctions 
One possible distinction is that general common law is in direct
competition with state laws dealing with identical issues; it is not
needed, therefore, because state law already performs the necessary
functions.69 State common law of contracts, for example, deals with
the same issues as the general common law of contracts. It does not
seem right or necessary to add a fifty-first version of state contract
law, dealing with the same exact questions. In contrast, it could be
argued, customary international law does not duplicate the laws of
the world’s member states; it adds something new, and useful, to
the equation by providing rules about how they should interact.70 
But this distinction is not, strictly speaking, accurate. Customary
international law comes, so to speak, in two different types: there is
the general synthesis that constitutes customary law, and there are
the individual states’ views on what customary international law
requires.71 The latter reflects the states’ experiences, interests, and
points of view, all of which form the basic raw material that
compose, generally, customary international law.72 For example,
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law expresses an
American view of international law, including much customary
law.73 Although the “general version” of customary international law
is formed in such a way as to synthesize all of the states’ views, it
should be expected that they might differ, just as general common
law and the common law of particular states do.74
A better distinction might rest on the different constitutional
statuses of customary international law and general common law.
69. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (“[T]he voice adopted by the
State as its own ... should utter the last word.”).
70. See HERBERT WOLCOTT BOWEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SIMPLE STATEMENT OF ITS
PRINCIPLES 1 (William S. Hein & Co. 2003) (1896) (“International law is the law recognized
by civilized nations as applicable to them in their relations with one another.”).
71. See BROWNLIE, supra note 52, at 7-10.
72. BOWEN, supra note 70, at 2.
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1
(1987).
74. Id. at ch. 1, intro. note.
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As Erie indicated, general common law effectively extended federal
authority into all areas that were covered by state common law, and
these included subject matters that did not fall under federal
authority in the U.S. Constitution.75
Customary international law, arguably, does not share that
defect. International law is a quintessentially federal subject mat-
ter; indeed, the federal government has authority under the treaty
power to regulate subject matter that would be unconstitutional if
it undertook to legislate in that area directly.76 Moreover, federal
treaty law is authorized specifically by the Constitution itself:
Article I, Section 8 provides a basis for federal legislation on the
subject,77 whereas Article II, Section 2 provides the executive with
a method for concluding treaties.78 Furthermore, the Supremacy
Clause provides, “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”79 
75. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
76. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“Acts of Congress are the supreme law
of the land only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to
be so when made under the authority of the United States.”).
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (stating that Congress shall have the power “[t]o define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law
of Nations”).
78. This Section states the following: 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
79. Id. art VI, § 2.
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This distinction, however, does not quite solve the problem.80 If
this argument were accepted, then it could constitute a powerful
claim against general common law—as indeed the Erie drafters,
who used it to justify their rejection of general common law,
believed it would.81 But it would not serve as a jurisprudential
argument that general common law does not exist because it relates
not to the nature or existence of law but to what law-making
authority the federal courts were entitled to exercise. This particu-
lar distinction between general common law and customary
international law, even if upheld as a matter of the reach of federal
power, does not explain why general common law does not exist but
customary international law does.
Although Erie’s jurisprudence is framed in categorical terms—
that “general common law does not exist”—this seems an overstate-
ment.82 General common law as it then existed might have been an
intrusion on states’ rights, a historical mistake, a misinterpretation
of the Rules of Decision Act, or a practice that created unacceptable
discrimination between locals and those nonresidents who qualified
for diversity jurisdiction. But those are different questions than
whether general common law exists. The existence of at least one
type of untethered norm—customary international law—indicates
that the claim that untethered norms do not exist cannot be true. 
This suggests that there might be subject matter areas in
addition to customary international law in which the premise that
there can be no untethered general common law should be chal-
80. First, the Supremacy Clause mentions only treaties and not customary international
law. The relative status of the two under the Supremacy Clause has thus been debated, with
certain literalists taking the position that customary international law is not included and
therefore does not preempt state law. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the
Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1581 (2003). If this
argument is accepted, then the ability to distinguish customary international law from
general common law on the basis of federal constitutional authority evaporates. Additionally,
although the “law of nations” is mentioned in Article I, Section 8, this is only to the extent
that Congress might act “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. In any event,
the cases in which customary international law was enforced in American courts did not
necessarily involve congressional definitions or any legislative action; therefore, Article I,
Section 8 might not be relevant.
81. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
82. See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84
VA. L. REV. 673, 676-77 (1998).
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lenged. We will next examine one such area with historical connec-
tions to general common law, in which foundations are currently in
flux on closely related issues: conflict of laws. 
III. CHOICE OF LAW AND UNTETHERED NORMS: AN EXPERIMENT
Explicit recognition of the existence of untethered norms might
pave the way for useful developments in one or more substantive
areas of law. In light of the experimental nature of this proposal, a
few preliminary observations are in order. 
First, the fact that general common law or something like it is a
possibility does not mean that general common law should be
adopted in its entirety. It does not seem likely that we would benefit
from using general common law as an all-purpose approach.
Instead, it could be called on when a particular subject matter is in
need of help. The comparison to customary international law
suggests that this can be done on a subject matter-by-subject matter
basis without a problem. 
Second, the relevant questions are not about existence because
it may not even be completely clear what that term means.
Admittedly, general common law has no physical existence; it is not
like Yosemite National Park or the Hope Diamond. But then,
neither is “Connecticut’s common law of contracts” much like either
of those, although there does not seem to be much hesitation about
saying that Connecticut contract law exists.83 In order to avoid
unresolved metaphysical questions about what it means to say that
a set of norms “exists,” we can rephrase the question to focus more
on whether we want to recognize some particular set of norms. The
question is not whether general common law exists as much as
whether we want to make use of the idea. 
Finally, we are not addressing here the important questions
regarding consistency with other statutory and constitutional
authorities. Resolving the jurisprudential question of existence does
not make these considerations go away. Federal court practice is
governed by statutes such as the Rules of Decision Act,84 not to
83. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-101 (West 2012).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
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mention the Rules Enabling Act,85 and the basic Erie holding
requiring judges to follow state decisional law.86
With these disclaimers in mind, I propose to explore here, briefly,
what recognition of untethered norms might contribute to the
foundations of one particular body of legal norms: choice of law.
A. Why Choice of Law?
There are several reasons that choice of law might be a promising
environment in which to test the utility of untethered norms. First,
choice of law is related historically to general common law in many
respects. It is suggestive that the same man, Joseph Beale, was
responsible for promoting both.87 We alluded to Professor Beale’s
remarks, above, on the foundations of general common law.88 Beale
was also the chief reporter for the First Restatement of Conflicts,
which relied in important ways on general common law.89 In this
light, choice of law and general common law appear to have
conceptual similarities and overlaps. While studying general com-
mon law, then, it makes sense to consider the utility of what we
learn from its cousin, choice-of-law theory.
The second reason for choosing choice of law as a test case is its
structural similarities to customary international law.90 As both
deal in large part with the interactions between different sover-
eigns, it is not surprising that similar substantive issues arise in
both. Common questions concern jurisdiction, deference to other
sovereigns, cooperation in enforcement of one another’s legal norms,
and other issues relating to interstate relations. Other commonali-
ties will be addressed below. Indeed, in many states, choice of law
is referred to as “private international law.”91 
85. Id. § 2072.
86. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
87. See generally 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.5 (1935).
88. See supra Part I.A.
89. For an account of the rivalry between Joseph Beale and the “legal realists” during the
1920s and 1930s, see generally LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960 (1986),
especially Chapter 2.
90. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 1531 (2011).
91. Id. at 1537 n.34.
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Finally, the policies, concepts, and strategies employed in inter-
national law and choice of law are overlapping, similar, or analo-
gous. For example, international law aspires to promote smooth,
uniform, and predictable interaction among states, relying on
strategies of mutuality, reciprocity of benefit, and comity.92 General
common law and customary international law both embody these
objectives. Choice of law, historically, proposed to do this by en-
suring that the same state’s law would be applied regardless of
where litigation was initiated. General common law sought to inte-
grate and unify state decisional law by creating a single uniform
substantive law that all courts might apply. Both employ different
strategies, but with the same underlying objectives. All in all, the
conclusions arrived at in general common law and customary
international law are ripe for application to American conflict of
laws, in particular choice of law.
B. Choice of Law: Basic Problem, Urgent Needs
Choice of law is one subject matter area in which foundational
debate has played a significant role. Its historical development has,
to some degree, tracked the development of the Erie doctrine,
although a decade or two later in time.93 As with Erie, at the start
of the twentieth century, things were relatively well settled and in
line with commonly held jurisprudential assumptions of the time.
By the middle of the century, however, a revolution was underway,
inspired by the jurisprudential developments of Erie.94
The earlier version of choice-of-law theory was grounded squarely
on pre-Erie jurisprudence. Joseph Beale was the author of the First
Restatement’s so-called “vested rights theory,” which indicated
application of the law of the state where the parties’ rights had
vested.95 The vesting of the parties’ rights took place in the state in
which the “last act” necessary to complete the cause of action
92. BOWEN, supra note 70, at 2.
93. See generally John R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 HOUS.
L. REV. 791 (1974).
94. See id.
95. For an extended discussion of the basic theoretical concepts of Beale’s vested rights
theory, with evaluation of the competing theoretical approaches, see LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1995). 
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occurred.96 Determination of which occurrence was the “last act,”
however, required a definitive account of what the last act was, a
point on which the contending states might disagree.97 In such
cases, only general common law could resolve the dispute; the judge
was supposed to turn to general common law for a definitive list of
necessary components of the cause of action to determine correctly
which act was “last.”98 
Around the time that Erie was decided, critics began to denounce
the underlying jurisprudence of the vested rights theory for its
metaphysical nature—a natural law theory about what constituted
a cause of action and what justified application of a particular
state’s law.99 The critical voices did not provide alternative ap-
proaches until the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Brainerd
Currie proposed a theory that came to be known as “governmental
interest analysis.”100 That theory examined the different state laws
vying for application to determine whether one or the other state
had an “interest” in having its law applied.101 These laws were
supposed to be subjected to the ordinary processes of statutory con-
struction and interpretation to determine whether either or both
were designed to apply to the particular fact pattern at issue in a
particular case.102
As has become increasingly evident, however, both traditional
and modern choice-of-law theories have metaphysical elements that
cannot be explained by reference to positive law.103 In the case of the
vested rights theory, proponent Joseph Beale relied on an a priori
definition of what constituted a vested right. His premises and defi-
nitions were distinctly untethered; indeed, they did not pretend to
96. See id. at 21.
97. For a critique of the notion that the function of choice of law is to identify the single
relevant connecting factor, a central premise for the First Restatement, see Brilmayer &
Anglin, supra note 34.
98. See BRILMAYER, supra note 95, at 23-25.
99. See id. at 25, 40. For an extended discussion of the function of the metaphysical notion
of “rights” as it applies to choice of law, see generally Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and
Choice of Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989).
100. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78
MICH. L. REV. 392 (1980).
101. Id. at 393-94.
102. Id. at 394.
103. Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 34, at 1174.
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be anything else.104 But the so-called “modern” approaches were
equally prone to dependence on a priori thinking. The govern-
mental-interest-analysis supporters used untethered norms to
determine whether the involved states had interests, despite their
criticism of First Restatement reliance on such metaphysical con-
structs, and their representation that modern theory avoided that
problem completely.105 The untethered norms are of a different sort
though; they take the shape of rules of statutory interpretation
compelling application of a law whenever a state domiciliary would
benefit from it.
It is striking, but not surprising, that choice-of-law theory has not
been able to rid itself of a priori assumptions about the nature of
law, the elements of a cause of action, and the purpose of the choice-
of-law process. Keeping in mind what has already been said about
untethered norms, even the Erie opinion was grounded in substan-
tial part on untethered reasoning about the nonexistence of general
common law. As argued earlier, the basic philosophical reasoning on
which a field of law is based is unlikely to be completely explicable
in terms of positive law.106 Erie’s authors did not appear to have
made any particular effort to avoid such assumptions or to conceal
the fact that this was what they had done.
There is good reason to believe that reliance on untethered
foundational norms is unavoidable, so the questions that must be
asked concern what would make the choice-of-law process most
satisfactory to the people who rely on it. Trying for complete
avoidance of value judgments from above or beyond the natural
reach of state law is a hopeless project that only leads either to
frustration or dishonest argumentation.107 Choice of law should
focus on identifying the most useful rules rather than devising a
system devoid of metaphysical assumptions. 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
105. See Brilmayer, supra note 100, at 392 (arguing that Currie did not escape the trap
that captured Joseph Beale, but engaged in equally metaphysical reasoning). 
106. See supra Part II.A.
107. See supra Part II.A.
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CONCLUSION
We have focused on just one of Erie’s many themes. There are
several other important ways of understanding the decision, which
are different from the focus here on jurisprudence and general
common law. These include (1) the belief that judges should not be
creative lawmakers but rather followers of the elected branches of
government; (2) the conviction that in the federal system created by
the U.S. Constitution, legislative power was given to Congress and
not the courts; (3) the position that the relevant federal statutes
limit judges’ discretion by requiring them to follow state law on
substantive matters; and (4) the premise that federal power is
limited: if federal judges were allowed to create general common
law, they would have wider jurisdiction than Congress and this
would violate the sovereignty of the states. 
These themes overlap with one another and with the theme of
central interest here, namely, the rejection of the general common
law of untethered norms. The chief difference is that all four of
these understandings differentiate between federal and state
judges. For example, federal judges are not elected, but many state
judges are.108 The statutes that limit the decision-making power of
federal courts do not apply to state courts. The fact that federal
authority is limited by the specific enumerated powers listed in the
Constitution has no relevance in limiting what states may do. And,
there is no concept comparable to Tenth Amendment state sover-
eignty that limits the states as they exercise their law-making
authority. 
The purely jurisprudential angle that we have been examining
does not depend on whether a dispute is heard in state or federal
court, nor does it depend on the support of a statute. One might say
that this principle, itself, is untethered.109 Indeed, focusing on how
strong the rejection of untethered norms really is—it applies to all
108. For information regarding the various methods of state judicial selection, see Judicial
Selection and Retention Resource Guide, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/
Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Selection-and-Retention/Resource-Guide.aspx (last visited
Jan. 13, 2013).
109. See supra Part II.A.
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courts, state or federal, simply because they are courts—makes one
suspicious that it goes too far. This Article reaches that conclusion.
If one puts aside the pejorative connotations and sets about
identifying what it was that supposedly made the general common
law so jurisprudentially unpalatable, the “brooding omnipresence”
starts to seem considerably less sinister. So it is far from clear,
jurisprudentially, why general common law has been declared a
dead letter while customary international law lives on. It is wrong
to say that general common law does not exist but customary
international law—or other possible models—does. A critical look
for Erie’s jurisprudential angle is essential—a jurisprudence that we
now take far too much for granted.
